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Abstract: In fields as diverse as technology entrepreneurship and the arts, crowds of interested 
stakeholders are increasingly responsible for deciding which innovations to fund, a privilege that was 
previously reserved for a few experts, such as venture capitalists and grant‐making bodies. Little is 
known about the degree to which the crowd differs from experts in judging which ideas to fund, and, 
indeed, whether the crowd is even rational in making funding decisions. Drawing on a panel of national 
experts and comprehensive data from the largest crowdfunding site, we examine funding decisions for 
proposed theater projects, a category where expert and crowd preferences might be expected to differ 
greatly. We instead find significant agreement between the funding decisions of crowds and experts. 
Where crowds and experts disagree, it is far more likely to be a case where the crowd is willing to fund 
projects that experts may not. Examining the outcomes of these projects, we find no quantitative or 
qualitative differences between projects funded by the crowd alone, and those that were selected by 
both the crowd and experts. Our findings suggest that crowdfunding can play an important role in 
complementing expert decisions, particularly in sectors where the crowds are end users, by allowing 
projects the option to receive multiple evaluations and thereby lowering the incidence of "false 
negatives."  
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1. Introduction  
One of the central insights of Schumpeter (1942) was to highlight the distinct roles played by 
entrepreneurs and investors in bringing new ideas to fruition, since it allowed for the possibility that 
good ideas might be precluded from the market because they were unable to attract financing from 
investors.  Other scholars have shown that the opinions of funding authorities similarly affect the 
direction of innovation in other critical fields, including scientific research (Bourdieu, 1975; Goldfarb, 
2008; Nelson, 1959) and creative industries (Caves, 2000, 2003).  In each setting, scholars have noted 
that constrained financing environments and the control exerted by a small group of experts means that 
projects that are ultimately funded are not necessarily “objectively best” but are subject to the specific 
information, agency, and organizational constraints faced by the small number of experts making 
funding decisions. (e.g. Caves, 2000; Ferrary & Granovetter, 2009; Goldfarb, 2008; Kerr, Nanda, & 
Rhodes-Kropf, 2013; Kortum & Lerner, 2000).   
Rapid technological advances over the past few years have made it significantly easier for 
innovators to circumvent experts, and instead communicate directly with a large number of interested 
stakeholders, leading to the growing reliance on “crowds” to make decisions that once rested solely in 
the hands of a small number experts.  For example, the crowdfunding platform Kickstarter has raised 
more than $1 billion for over 60,000 projects from over six million backers since its founding in 2009, 
projects that may otherwise have needed to seek funding from venture investors or grant-making 
bodies.  In fact, since 2012, this platform alone raises more money for the arts annually than the total 
funding provided through the US government-run National Endowment for the Arts. The importance of 
crowd-based decisions are growing in a wide range of fields, including the funding of technology-based 
startups (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013; Mollick, 2014), the development of new products (Afuah 
& Tucci, 2012; Poetz & Schreier, 2012; Von Hippel, 1986) and scientific research (Franzoni & Sauermann, 
2014).   
Despite the growing role of crowds in making decisions once left to experts, little is known about 
how crowds and experts may differ in their ability to judge projects. Indeed, for crowds, at least, there is 
even considerable debate over whether their decisions are actually based on rational criteria at all.  Two 
popular books separated by 150 years offer starkly different views of the nature of crowd decision-
making, with Charles Mackay (1852) warning about the “madness of crowds” while James Surowiecki 
(2004) more recently extolled the “wisdom of crowds.” Studies to date attempting to understand the 
differences between crowds and experts have focused on prediction tasks or markets, where 
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aggregated decisions can be more accurate than individual actions (Budescu & Chen, 2014; Larrick, 
Mannes, & Soll, 2012; Ray, 2006; Tetlock, 2005), or else on cases where organizations can get positive 
results by reaching out to crowds under carefully controlled circumstances (Bogers, Afuah, & Bastian, 
2010; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009).  Crowdfunding, on the other hand, does not have any such controls, 
and differs from these previous phenomena in many ways: there is no market reward mechanism for 
correct answers; no clear criteria determining what is being “predicted”; no expert oversight of the 
crowd decision-making process; and no direct coordination between crowd members. In this case, the 
crowd can be subject to many group decision-making fallacies, as Isenberg (2012) argued about 
crowdfunding: “group irrationality is well-documented — crowds are ‘wise’ only in a very limited set of 
circumstances. As often as not, crowds bring us tulip crazes, subprime meltdowns, the Kitty Genovese 
scandal, Salem witch trials, and other tragedies.” There is no clear evidence on whether crowds are 
rational at all, and, if they are, what differences might exist between the judgment of crowds and that of 
experts. 
Thus, we are interested in shedding light on two questions about the judgment of crowds 
compared to experts.  First, we aim to provide the first robust analysis of the degree to which experts 
would agree with crowdfunding decisions that rely on taste and judgment, rather than prediction, using 
rich data from the crowdfunding platform Kickstarter.  The second related question we seek to 
understand is whether crowd-based decision making is “mad” (irrational and inconsistent in decision 
making relative to experts) or “wise” (generally consistent in selecting potentially successful projects).  
Several features of our research design aim to address the specific challenges associated with 
making such a comparison. First, we have complete data on crowdfunding campaigns (that is, the 
“applications”) for all projects, including those that were unsuccessful, so that we are not sampling on 
success.  Second, we focus our study to theater projects, which have a number of appealing features: 
evaluating them entails both a subjective artistic component and an understanding of the commercial 
bottom line which provides useful variation for our study.  Further, it is possible to develop a somewhat 
objective sense of the long-run success of the projects using data on ticket sales and critical reviews in 
the press so that we can also compare the funding decisions with real outcomes.  Additionally, theater 
funding is a one-time event, not subject to the challenges associated with multi-stage financing that 
might lead crowds to choose different investments from deep-pocked professional investors even if they 
rated projects the same (Nanda & Rhodes-Kropf, 2012). Finally, we recruit expert evaluators who have 
deep expertise judging theater applications for institutions such as the National Endowment for the 
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Arts.  The projects were rendered in the same format as the Kickstarter campaigns, had similar financial 
requirements to traditional grant applicants, and were stripped of any references to the outcome of the 
campaign. We randomly assign “sets” of projects to these experts to evaluate, where each set consists 
of three failed and three successful projects.  This approach allows us to also include expert fixed effects 
to examine the robustness of our results.  
We have three main findings.  First, on average, we find a statistically significant congruence 
between the realized funding decisions by crowds and the evaluation of those same projects by experts.  
Projects that were funded by the crowds received consistently higher scores from experts, were more 
likely to be rated as being the best of the six in the set, and were much more likely to have received 
funding from the experts.  This pattern was equally true for projects that were “overfunded” on 
Kickstarter – that is, projects that raised more money that was asked for. Given the strong positive 
correlations we observe in crowd and expert evaluations, even in a category with a subjective nature 
such as theater, this suggests both broad similarities between how experts and crowds judge projects 
and that crowds are generally consistent in their choices of which projects to back, allowing us to reject 
the “madness of crowds” in our setting.  
Our second finding is that despite the broad congruence in evaluation, we see a systematic 
pattern in terms of the disagreement.  Of the projects where there is no agreement, the crowd is much 
more likely to have funded a project that the judge did not like than the reverse.  Around 75% of the 
projects where there is a disagreement are ones where the crowd funded a project but the expert would 
not have funded it.  We also see a clear pattern in terms of the characteristics of projects that are liked 
by the crowds:  they offer multiple tiers of rewards and provide more updates. In fact, projects that 
were ranked highly by the experts but not funded by crowds had systematically fewer reward levels, 
fewer pictures and fewer videos.   That is, we seem to find that there is an “art” to raising money from 
crowds, one that may be systematically different from that of raising money from experts.  The crowds 
seem to place emphasis on, or extract information content from different attributes of the process than 
experts.  
Our third finding relates to the longer-term outcomes of these projects.  An attractive feature of 
the fact that most of the disagreements are related to projects funded by the crowd, we are able to 
compare the long term outcomes of projects that were liked by both crowds and experts and those liked 
only by the crowds.  Despite the fact that these were not rated as highly by the experts, we find no 
qualitative or quantitative differences in the long-term outcomes of these projects.  They are equally 
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likely to have delivered on budget, result in organizations that continue to operate, and, although the 
metrics for success are subjective, we find strong qualitative evidence that many of these shows had 
both commercial success and received positive critical acclaim in national outlets such as the New York 
Times.   
We should note that these third set of results are more tentative due to the smaller sample size. 
However, these patterns suggest that the entry that is facilitated by crowdfunding has the potential to 
lower the incidence of “false negatives,” (that is, viable projects that are turned down by funders) by 
allowing projects the option to receive multiple evaluations and reach out to receptive communities 
that may not otherwise be represented by experts. Indeed, crowdfunding allows project creators to 
directly contact potential customers, providing a rich source of data on the potential interest in an 
artistic endeavor, in addition to any funds raised.   
Our results are relevant to the growing interest to management scholars in the role of crowds in 
addressing traditional organizational functions (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Boudreau, Lacetera, & Lakhani, 
2011; Franzoni & Sauermann, 2014; Greenstein & Zhu, 2014; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009). Our findings are 
also related to the role that crowds may play in reducing financing constraints of new ventures.  The 
falling cost of starting new ventures has allowed the possibility of individuals with small amounts of 
capital to participate in financing such ventures, and our results shed light on the extent to which 
backers on these platforms may be able to reduce information asymmetries as opposed to becoming 
victims to information cascades. We address the generalizability of our findings in Section 6. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we outline the theoretical predictions 
associated with studying differences between crowds and experts.  Section 3 outlines our methods and 
provides details on the implementation of the survey.  Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 outlines 
our main findings. Section 6 provides a discussion of the results and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Theory 
Scholars have long noted the great importance of experts, who have historically held a 
privileged position in many industries, acting as arbiters of taste, quality, and appropriateness (e.g. 
Caves, 2000; Ginsburgh, 2003; Zuckerman, 1999).  Expert judgments are influential in a number of ways, 
including acting as predictors of commercial success and influencers of popular opinion (Eliashberg & 
Shugan, 1997), as well gatekeepers of vital resources (Ginsburgh, 2003; Reinstein & Snyder, 2005b).  As 
an example of these three forms of influence, consider experts who select which entrepreneurial 
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ventures should receive funding: venture capitalists. VCs select firms to fund based on their predictions 
of future market demand (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Shane & Venkataraman, 
2003). Further, venture capital investment serves as an influential signal to other players in the market, 
suggesting a startup is to be taken seriously (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Hellmann & Puri, 2002). Finally, 
venture capitalists serve as gatekeepers to vital resources.  As Ferrary and Granovetter (2009) write: “By 
selecting start-ups, the VC firms implicitly prevent the other agents in the complex network of 
innovation from collaborating with start-ups that do not get VC funding. It could be argued that 
potential valuable innovations have never reached customers because they did not get VC funding.” 
In the arts, where profitability is not always the standard goal of creators, experts play an even 
more critical role as influencers and gatekeepers.  Especially in high culture, expert critics are 
“sometimes more important than creators,” since they determine the governing aesthetics of high 
culture, as well as which creators receive resources (Gans, 2008). Studies in the film industry, for 
example, have shown that expert critics are particularly influential to the success of smaller artistic 
movies (Reinstein & Snyder, 2005a).  Further, experts are often gatekeepers of funding for the arts, 
playing critical roles in allocating funding from the government, corporate, and foundation sources that 
make up 24.6% of all revenues for not-for-profit performing arts groups and museums in the United 
States (Woronkowicz, Nicols, & Iyengar, 2012).  Crowdfunding, however, offers an alternative to the 
traditional expert control over artistic funding and culture. 
Crowdfunding provides a method of funding projects that differs in several aspects from expert-
run processes like grant-making or venture capital.  First, rather than being in the hands of a small group 
of individuals, it is democratic – over six million people have funded projects on Kickstarter alone.  
Second, as opposed to the tightly-knit expert community (Wenger & Snyder, 2000), crowdfunding 
backers are loosely organized, if at all.  Third, compared to the closed networks of Silicon Valley or the 
world of theater, in crowdfunding almost all communication between those seeking funding and 
potential backers occurs in open, online communities. Fourth, crowdfunding in its current form involves 
no equity or monitoring rights1; backers have little to no further influence over organizations they 
backed, and gain no return other than the potential of enjoying the outcome of a project.  
                                                          
1 The data collected is from a period where crowdfunding where no equity investment is permitted, though the US 
Congress has authorized equity crowdfunding (JOBS Act, 112th Congress), it has yet to be implemented as of the 
time of this writing. 
7 
 
The use of crowd judgment in crowdfunding also differs greatly from prior approaches to 
generating information from large groups.  Other attempts to harness the innovative power of large 
groups – such as crowdsourcing (Poetz & Schreier, 2012), innovation tournaments (Boudreau, Lacetera, 
& Lakhani, 2010; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009), and collective and group innovation (Jeppesen & 
Frederiksen, 2006; O’Mahony, 2003) – ultimately have an expert authority overseeing the actions of the 
crowd. And, unlike prediction markets (M. Chen, 2008; Ray, 2006; Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004), crowd-
based approaches do not operate like markets, in that there are not buyers and sellers trading contracts 
in an efficient manner.  Instead, crowd judgment depends on the aggregate actions of many individuals 
making small contributions to a larger goal, in the place of experts making large-scale resource 
allocation choices themselves. While the success or failure of a particular project may be influenced by 
the degree of pledges already made (Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2013), backing decisions are individual, not 
collective.  There is no centralized price-setting mechanism, tournament, or selection process that 
aggregates crowd preferences.  Thus, the crowd in crowdfunding consists of a group of mostly 
uncoordinated amateurs. 
Theory provides ambiguous predictions about whether and how crowd evaluations should differ 
from that of experts.  One the one hand, the crowd allows for a wider range of expertise and 
preferences to be leveraged in group decision-making, suggesting that ‘collective wisdom’ might make 
evaluation more accurate, reducing information frictions and providing greater efficiency in financing 
decisions.  For example, studies on forecasting have supported the idea that experts are no more 
accurate than informed amateurs (Tetlock, 2005), while examination of Wikipedia has shown that it 
compares favorably on many dimensions to expert-created content (Clauson, Polen, Boulos, & 
Dzenowagis, 2008; Giles, 2005; Rajagopalan et al., 2011).  Further, recent research on Wikipedia has 
shown that while there may be political biases in certain articles (Greenstein & Zhu, 2012), as these 
articles are more heavily edited by the crowd, they ultimately become less biased than similar work 
produced by the experts at Encyclopedia Britannica (Greenstein & Zhu, 2014).  
The research on crowds that seeks to explain these findings focuses on the value of combining 
many opinions, as opposed to relying on the views of individual experts (Larrick & Soll, 2012). When 
crowds have diverse sources of information and expertise with a problem area, they can provide more 
accurate collective forecasting than can even well-informed individuals (Larrick et al., 2012).  Indeed, a 
substantial amount of research has gone into examining the best method of combining the predictions 
of many individuals as accurately as possible (Budescu & Chen, 2014; Larrick & Soll, 2012; Makridakis & 
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Winkler, 1983). While these studies have shed considerable light on how to employ the wisdom of the 
crowd, the emphasis on assessing crowds based on accuracy assumes that there is an objectively 
defined “correct answer” that both the crowd and experts are attempting to reach.  When selecting 
startup companies to fund, artistic works to develop, or innovations to pursue, the nature of a correct 
answer is less clear.  In these cases, the key issue is less about selecting a combined prediction and much 
more about understanding whether there are systematic differences between crowds and experts in the 
types of projects they seem to prefer, or, indeed, if crowds are at all consistent in how they assess 
projects. 
We may expect several factors to drive some systematic differences in the types of projects that 
are funded by crowds compared to experts.  First, it is not clear that the crowd, as a whole, has the 
expertise to evaluate projects in the same way as experts (Simmons, Nelson, Galak, & Frederick, 2011).  
There are no admissions criteria for entering the crowd, making it unclear how the crowd would develop 
criteria to identify potentially high quality projects in areas where they do not have expertise. Since 
crowds are pledging smaller amounts of money per project, they also have less of an incentive to gather 
information on the project and hence are more likely to be subject to herding driven by information 
cascades.  Such herding can be rational, as outlined by several economics models (Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Devenow & Welch, 1996; Scharfstein & Stein, 1990), where 
project backers observe the actions of other project backers, and thus view the presence of other 
backers as a sign of quality. Herding can also be mimetic, as backers simply mimic others, without an 
underlying rationale (Cipriani & Guarino, 2005).  Crowds may also suffer from a wide variety of factors 
identified by social psychologists and cognitive scientists that degrade the quality of crowd decision-
making (e.g. Bahrami et al., 2012; Latane, Williams, Harkins, & Latané, 1979; Raafat, Chater, & Frith, 
2009).  For example, groups can be subject to emotional contagion (Barsade, 2002) and even to 
hysterical reaction (Balaratnasingam & Janca, 2006), that may cause crowd members to act in non-
rational ways.  Crowds could also be fall into patterns of group thinking which bias information 
processing (Janis, 1982), may overly rely on the work of others (Earley, 1989; Latane et al., 1979), or may 
deemphasize information that is not shared among group members (Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, 
Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006).  
We do not seek to specify which biases may operate under which conditions in crowdfunding, 
but rather argue that there are many potential reasons why crowds would operate in ways that might 
be less than wise, especially as crowdfunding does not resemble more controlled opinion-aggregation 
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approaches to harnessing crowd wisdom (Budescu & Chen, 2014; Simmons et al., 2011). Indeed, early 
studies have found herding in peer-to-peer lending, a form of crowdfunding, with conflicting evidence 
over the degree to which herding represents positive information cascades or mere imitation (D. Chen & 
Lin, 2014; Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2013; Zhang & Liu, 2012).  Thus, both prior theory and early empirical 
results suggest that the crowd could be irrational, subject to many potential biases that would result in 
inconsistent judgments without clear patterns or decision criteria. 
Even in the absence of group biases that subvert rational decision-making, the crowd and 
experts may differ based on taste or other preferences.  The difference in cultural tastes have long been 
a subject of interest to scholars (Bourdieu, 1984; DiMaggio, 1991; Gans, 2008; Peterson & Kern, 1996), 
and the funding decision of experts and crowds would reasonably be expected to reflect differences in 
high culture and popular culture (Gans, 2008).  Even as cultural tastes change among the elite (Peterson 
& Kern, 1996), there is still a strong belief that many forms of high culture, serious theater prominent 
among them (Shrum, 1991), would not be supported by popular culture.  Further, the tastes of the 
critics serves a role beyond selecting artwork, and is part of the process by which elite social classes 
sustain and replicate themselves (DiMaggio, 1991).  Additionally, the difference in tastes between the 
crowd and experts may not even be based on the underlying quality of the work. Given that some 
significant proportion of crowdfunding is based on the support of friends and family (Agrawal, Catalini, 
& Goldfarb, 2010), it could simply be that the crowd is primarily focused on supporting popular 
individuals, rather than quality products. These differences in tastes are important, as selection contexts 
that apply different preferences in funding projects can result in the support of very different forms of 
art (Wijnberg & Gemser, 2000) and alter the sorts of ideas that are ultimately funded and pursued 
throughout the economy.  Therefore, even in the absence of group cognitive biases that make decision-
making inconsistent, crowds may still have a completely different set of tastes then experts, suggesting 
that moving from expert to crowd-based judgments could radically alter the type and nature of art being 
funded. 
Ultimately, we are left with two potential views of the crowd.  In one case, we have a crowd that 
is fundamentally wise.  It may differ on some selection criteria from experts due to taste or the structure 
in which screening takes place, but would have a consistent set of decisions that have a rational 
underlying framework. If the crowd is wise, the key question becomes the taste of the crowd compared 
to experts, and its consequences.  A second option is that the crowd is instead more subject to the many 
potential fallacies of group cognition; is driven by factors unrelated to quality; has radically different 
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tastes than experts; and/or is inconsistent in its judgment.  Our study aims to shed light on which of 
these two polar extremes best typifies the nature of crowdfunding we see today, and to explore the 
differences between expert and crowd judgment. 
3. Research Design 
We chose to work with data from Kickstarter, which is the largest and most prominent 
crowdfunding platform in the world, having successfully helped raise over $1 billion in funding across all 
applicants in the last five years.  Due to the strong network effects that tend to be present in such 
platforms, working with the largest, most prominent, and successful platform ensures that we are likely 
to observe a representative set of projects -- including the very best -- that are seeking funding from 
crowds.  A second attractive feature of our setting is that we have access to all the campaigns run by 
Kickstarter, including those that did not succeed in meeting their funding goals, which allows us to look 
at the differences in evaluation, without sampling on success.   
Since a key goal of our paper is to examine the extent to which experts would agree with the 
funding decisions of crowds, we focused our analysis on a field where there is an established set of 
externally-validated experts that could be used to examine the judgment of crowds.  We also wanted to 
focus on an area where projects have both a subjective artistic component and a measure of a 
commercial bottom line, since the former is a setting where tastes may be expected to differ and the 
latter is a feature that is particularly relevant for new ventures outside of the arts.  Given these two 
criteria, we decided to focus on theater, where the existing literature suggests a long-standing tension 
between experts and mass audiences in artistic endeavors (Gans, 2008; Kim & Jensen, 2011; Wijnberg & 
Gemser, 2000) while at the same time embodying many features of projects that have a commercial 
bottom line.  Theater is especially relevant in crowdfunding, because, as mentioned, as of 2012, 
Kickstarter campaigns became a larger funder of the arts than the expert-run National Endowment of 
the Arts.   
Figure 1 provides an annotated example of a Kickstarter theater project from our sample.  As 
can be seen in the Figure, project creators generate a pitch to convince backers to support their project, 
using a combination of video, text, and images to communicate their vision for the completed project.  
As is common in reward-based crowdfunding, backers may receive some sort of reward for a project, 
such as a ticket or a mention in a program, but do not gain any financial stake in the project or profit 
from the project in any way.  Pitches, project goals, and aspirations of project creators can vary widely 
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between projects, and the projects in our sample included revivals of Broadway plays, adaptations of 
books to the stage, original musicals, works aimed at children, and new dramatic productions. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Theater also has the attractive property that it is possible to measure “real outcomes” in a 
manner that is independent of the funding decision, by learning about the commercial performance or 
critical reviews of projects following the Kickstarter campaign. Although some of these data are noisy, 
they help shed some light on whether the real outcomes also correlate with funding decisions.  They are 
also especially useful in addressing whether projects attempt to deliver their promised outcomes. 
We restrict our attention to Kickstarter projects that were aiming to raise at least $10,000 in 
funding. The funding goal of at least $10,000 focuses on the subset of applicants whose ambitions and 
goals are more closely aligned with those applying for funding from traditional sources such as the 
National Endowment for the Arts, as well as several other grant making organizations for theater.  To 
put this in perspective, the NEA made 1,083 grants in the first round of funding for FY 2014, with an 
average grants size of around $24,000.  The average funding goal for projects in our sample is $20,500, 
with the largest goal for successful projects being $75,000.   
For experts, we draw on the experience of 30 judges who have deep and extensive knowledge 
of theater, as evidenced by their background in evaluating theater applications for national grant 
making bodies such as the National Endowment for the Arts2 ).  We asked each of these judges to 
evaluate 6 projects, 3 of which were successes and 3 of which were failures.  We were able to strip out 
any data on the outcome of the project, but still render the projects, including videos, for the judges in a 
manner that was equivalent to the display on Kickstarter (including fonts, graphics, typographic errors, 
etc.)  This not only allows us to have a representative set of applications for funding (rather than just 
evaluating the successful cases), but also allows us to display the applications similar to the way that the 
crowds viewed them, and hence evaluated them.   
Evaluations were conducted using an online survey instrument derived from extensive 
interviews and testing with individuals who had been involved in judging for the NEA.  We identified five 
                                                          
2 Judges have served on a mean of 5 panels each for national theater prizes and awards. All judges were also 
involved in theater, either as critics, artistic directors, dramaturges, theater managers, or in some other role. In 
addition to the NEA, judges had been part of panels for the Mellon Foundation, the Doris Duke Charitable Trust, 
and other major theater prizes and grant-making bodies. 
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key criteria, and asked three questions about each, using a Likert scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being 
“Strongly Agree.”  The five criteria we evaluated were: novelty (example: “This project is original”), 
feasibility (example: “This project can be implemented with the resources in the proposal”), quality 
(example: “The proposal for the project is of high quality “), reach (examples: “This project would reach 
a diverse audience” and “This project would be commercially viable/profitable”), and social relevance 
(example: “Assuming it was completed as planned, this project would advance a cultural, political, or 
artistic dialogue”).  The Appendix contains the full list of questions as well as details on the survey 
instrument.  Additionally, we showed judges the goal of the Kickstarter project in question, and asked 
“How much do you think this project should be funded for, in dollars? Answer 0 if you do not think it 
should be funded. Assume you have enough budget to fully fund all of the projects in the survey.” We 
also asked judges to list the best and worst projects of those that they had seen.  
We generated a stratified random sample of theater projects that attempted to raise at least 
$10,000 on the Kickstarter platform between May, 2009 and June 2012.  We focused our attention on 
projects that were raising money for a specific performance, as opposed to efforts such as fundraising 
for building a new theater. Again, this was to match the types of proposals typically seen in national 
grant competitions.  
There were 257 projects that met our criteria, from which we randomly selected 120. 
Specifically, we created 20 “sets” of 6 projects each, where each set was comprised of 3 projects that 
failed to reach their funding goal, 2 projects that achieved their goal and 1 project that exceeded its 
funding goal3.  Hence, our stratified random sample consisted of 60 failed projects (from a total of 141 
failed projects), 40 projects that just met their goal (from a total of 85 such projects) and 20 projects 
that exceeded their goal (from a total of 31 such projects).  Each set of 6 projects was then randomly 
assigned to a judge, who evaluated the six projects on a range of criteria described above.   
It is worth pointing out that since projects were randomly assigned to sets, and judges were 
randomly assigned, our objective was to ensure that once a judge agreed to evaluate the projects, they 
did a diligent job in their evaluation (rather than to ensure a high ‘response rate’ in terms of judges 
agreeing to evaluate our projects as might be a standard concern in other surveys).  We incentivized 
judges with a $50 gift certificate for completing the survey, helping us gain the participation of the high 
                                                          
3 We defined exceeding the funding goal as raising over 10% more than the ideal goal. 
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quality experts we required for our test. The quality of the responses is measurable in a number of ways.  
First, we note that there were virtually no missing values in the responses from the judges, so that there 
is no response bias in our results.4 Second, half the sets (that is 60 projects) were randomly assigned to a 
second judge for evaluation.  Using a squared weighting scheme appropriate for subjective scoring 
(Cohen, 1968), the kappa statistic which measures the inter-rater agreement for these judges was 0.44.  
The Z statistic was 7.14, strongly rejecting the hypothesis that the scores were generated at random.  
While the kappa statistic of 0.44 suggests moderate agreement among the judges, it is worth noting that 
theater projects have an inherent element of subjectivity to them.  Given this, we are reassured that 
there is a strong and consistent signal that seems to emerge from the judges’ evaluations of the 
projects. Also, as will be discussed, we use a variety of methods of measuring the judge’s responses to 
proposed projects, and find the decisions to be robust across these approaches. 
Overall, our research design aims to combine the expertise of real judges for traditional grant 
making bodies with a sample of applications from a crowd funding platform that reduces, if not 
eliminates, many of the concerns about selection that were outlined above. On a qualitative dimension, 
feedback from our survey participants suggested that there was reasonable overlap in the types of 
projects applying for funding through Kickstarter and the types that they had judged for in the past.  In 
addition, many judging bodies, including the National Endowment for the Arts, are moving towards a 
system where judges have electronic access to applications, in part to be able to view videos that 
provide much richer information on the application in a short amount of time.  This reduces concern 
that the mode of information dissemination is foreign to the judges although we cannot rule out that 
specific projects were presented in a mode that was alien to judges. We address this specific issue in 
Sections 5 and 6, below.  
We also conducted a second survey in which we contacted the creators of the 60 successful 
projects in our sample to determine the longer-term outcomes of their project.  We used a modified 
version of a previously applied questionnaire [self-identifying citation omitted], and asked for a variety 
of qualitative and quantitative outcomes, including information about the audience of play as well as 
critical reviews.  We supplemented this information with additional online searches, using Factiva and 
Google, to find other reviews of the productions funded through Kickstarter.  Together, this material 
provides rich data on project outcomes along a variety of dimensions. 
                                                          
4 One judge omitted some fields on one of the 6 projects that s/he evaluated. 
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4. Data 
Since 10 sets of projects were evaluated by two judges each and the other 10 evaluated by one 
judge, we have a total of 180 evaluations for the 120 projects. For each response, we have basic 
information on the background of judges, such as their main affiliation with the theater community 
(academic, actor, critic, director, writer or other) and the number of national grant making institutions 
they have judged for in the past.  For each project in the set that the judge evaluates, we have 
information on the judge’s familiarity with the project, their rating of the project’s novelty, relevance to 
the community, quality, feasibility and commercial viability. We also provide the judges with the funding 
goal of the project and ask them how much they would be willing to allocate to the given project, 
assuming they were not constrained in terms of the total funding they needed to allocate. 
These 180 responses form the core of the data we use for this paper.  However, we have two 
other sets of data that we match to the 120 projects.  First, we have data on the attributes of the 
projects and their fundraising process on Kickstarter.  For example, we know the location of the 
individual raising the funds, the number of individuals who pledged funding, and the total amount that 
was pledged (even when the goal was not successful), as well as the number of distinct reward levels 
that were developed to induce participation by the crowd. We also coded the number of videos and 
photographs the project displayed.  Second, we have aimed to collect long-term outcome information 
on the projects, both through the survey of project founders and through web searches.  The objective 
here is to try and codify the degree to which the individuals themselves, as well as external observers, 
deemed these projects to be commercial and artistic successes.  These data are much more likely to be 
present for projects that were successful, so our main comparison is between projects that were funded 
by the crowd and were rated highly by experts and those that the crowd funded but were rated poorly 
by the experts.  Our follow up survey of the Kickstarter projects that were successful yielded a 53% 
response rate (32 of the 60 projects), of which 28 completed all of the needed data, a high rate for web-
based surveys (Kriauciunas, Parmigiani, & Rivera-Santos, 2011).  Further, we find no observable 
differences in the attributes of the projects for which there was a response and for which there was 
none.  We use these survey responses to compare the longer term outcome of these funded projects. In 
addition to the survey results, we have attempted to code the degree of artistic success for these 
projects, using critical reviews in the press. 
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5. Results 
We start by outlining descriptive statistics on the projects in Table 1. Table 1 compares the 
evaluations of projects that achieved their funding goal on Kickstarter with those that did not succeed.  
The judges seem to consistently rate the successful projects higher than those that did not achieve their 
funding goal.  Since there are 6 projects in each set, the probability that one of them will be ranked 
either the best or the worst is 1/6.  However, Table 1 shows that projects that were funded by the 
crowds were twice as likely to be ranked as the best project, while those that were unsuccessful were 
more than two times as likely to be ranked as the worst project by judges.  Finally, even though judges 
were told that should provide a hypothetical funding as if they were unconstrained in allocating funds to 
projects, they greatly favored projects supported by the crowd, allocating an average of 1.5 times more 
funds to successful projects than those that were unsuccessful. 
[Table 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
There are two patterns that emerge from Table 1, which can be seen most clearly in Figure 2, 
which graphs the distribution of the judges combined scores for both successful and unsuccessful 
projects.  First, there seems to be a strong and systematic positive correlation between the judgment of 
crowds and of experts: projects funded on Kickstarter are systematically evaluated as being better by 
experts.  Second, this strong correlation does not tell the full story – the scores and the funding amounts 
proposed by the experts are not as stark as the decision about whether or not to fund projects, 
suggesting that there are projects that are funded on Kickstarter that do not seem to be highly rated by 
experts, and others that raised funding but were not as highly rated by experts. We probe these two 
patterns further in the following Tables. 
[Table 2 about here] 
In Table 2, we investigate the robustness of the positive correlations between expert 
evaluations and crowd funding, using the results from the first judge who responded for each project.  
Columns 1-3 report the coefficients on OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the average 
score assigned to a project by the judges.  The main variable of interest is an indicator variable that 
takes a value of 1 for projects that either met or exceeded their funding goal.  Column 1 of Table 2 
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reports the average scores of the two types of successful projects relative to the unsuccessful ones.  
Column 2 adds covariates related to the background of the judges, their experience with judging for 
grant-making foundations, and their prior familiarity with the specific projects in the survey they were 
asked to evaluate.  Column 3 adds judge fixed effects to control for other fixed differences across 
judges, such as their average leniency or harshness, a bias in favor of or against theater projects raising 
money from the crowds, or a specific objective function they have for theater projects.  
Moving across Columns 1-3 of Table 2 provides a very consistent picture of the strong 
correlation between the evaluation of judges and crowds. The inclusion of covariates and judge fixed 
effects increases the R-squared of the regressions considerably, implying these control variables add 
significant explanatory power to the regressions.  Yet the coefficient on the indicator variables for 
success remain remarkably stable.5  The magnitudes on the coefficients are intuitive and relate to the 
magnitudes reported in Table 1.  Unsuccessful projects score approximately 2.6 out of 5 on average, 
while those that reach or exceed their funding goals score about 3.2.6  Columns 4-6 repeat the same 
regressions, but where the dependent variable is now the funding share proposed by the experts for 
projects.  They validate the results shown in Columns 1-3.      
Table 2 therefore shows that, on average, the evaluation of equivalent projects by crowds and 
experts has a strong positive correlation.   Moreover, it also documents that projects that exceed their 
goals are not the result of “the madness of crowds.”  Rather, if we use the expert evaluations as a 
benchmark of quality, it points to the fact that, on average, crowds do a good job of evaluating projects 
and screening the good from the bad.   
The number of observations in the regressions in Table 2 is 120 rather than 180 because, 
although we have 2 sets of evaluations per project for half the projects, we have only included the first 
evaluation from each judge in order to provide consistency in terms of the weight given to each project 
                                                          
5 This is also reassuring because it shows us that the patterns we see are not driven by some judges “picking at 
random” and others who might be ‘peeking’ at the outcomes and thereby providing results that were 
systematically correlated with project outcomes.  We should note also that we explicitly asked judges whether 
they were familiar with projects and in only 2 of 180 did they respond that they were very familiar with a particular 
project.    
6 In unreported regressions, we find that although the point estimates for the projects that exceed their goal is 
always higher, a Wald test for the difference in the coefficient between the two types of successful projects cannot 
reject the hypothesis that they are the same.   
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in the regression. This leads to the question as to whether our results are sensitive to the choice of 
judge.   
In order to address the question of the sensitivity of results to our choice of judge, we start by 
noting that since we have 10 sets of projects with two judges each, 10 projects only had one judge each, 
we have 210 (or 1,024) possible combinations of judges for the 10 sets.7  To understand the role of the 
choice of judges, we look at all 1,024 combinations rather than just at the result of regressions from any 
one of these 1,024 combinations.  This provides us with more confidence that we are not arbitrarily 
choosing a combination that happens to be statistically significant.  We find the magnitude of the 
average score for successful projects ranges from 0.35 more than the unsuccessful to 0.7 more (with a 
mean of 0.52 larger). In all but two of the 1,024 combinations, the p-value is below 0.05. The largest p-
value is 0.06, providing us with greater confidence that the results documented in Table 2 are 
statistically significant and robust to any of the other 1,023 combination of judges we might have picked 
in reporting our results.  Similarly, the funding share results range from 0.18 more to 0.26 more for the 
projects that are successful on Kickstarter, and are always significant at the 5% significance level.  Our 
results therefore document that there is a strong positive correlation between the evaluation by crowds 
and experts on projects. 
Despite these positive results about the wisdom of crowds on average, it does not necessarily 
mean that they can perfectly substitute for experts in every instance – it is this heterogeneity between 
crowds and experts that we turn to next.  
Heterogeneity in Expert and Crowd Evaluations 
In order to examine heterogeneity in crowd and expert evaluations, we segment each of our 120 
projects into one of four mutually exclusive categories – (1) those that are funded by both experts and 
crowds, (2) those that are funded by neither, (3) those funded only by experts and (4) those funded only 
by crowds.  While we have outcome data on whether the crowd funded a project or not, we do not have 
actual funding decisions from experts. Rather, we have survey responses to a question asking them how 
much of the goal they would fund, assuming their grant-making budget was not constrained.   
                                                          
7 As a simpler example, suppose we only had 4 sets, and had 2 sets that were sent to two judges (set 1 to judges A 
and B, set 2 to judges C and D) and 2 sets that we sent only to one judge (set 3 to judge E and set 4 to judge F).  In 
this case we would have 22 or 4 unique combinations of judge evaluations across 24 projects:  ACEF, ADEF, BCEF 
and BDEF.    
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Our categorization of whether a judge hypothetically funded a project is thus based on our 
mapping of their responses to a hypothetical funding decision, one that is dependent on two factors.  
The first factor is the harshness of the screen we use – that is, whether we deem a project to be funded 
by a judge only if the judge funds the project a 100% or if we are willing to deem the project to be 
funded by experts when they only want to fund, say, 50% or 75% of the goal.  Although it may seem like 
we only want to use 100% as the funding threshold (just like with the funding criterion on Kickstarter), 
our discussions with experts suggest that they routinely give projects that seem viable less money than 
requested and hence we do not necessarily want to use the most harsh screen when deemed projects 
as hypothetically funded by experts.  Second, as above, since half the projects are evaluated by 2 judges, 
the question of whether the project was funded by experts potentially depends on which expert’s 
funding choice we use.   
[Table 3 about here] 
While in theory these different empirical strategies can make large differences, in practice we 
find that the distribution of projects across buckets, and the overall patterns we show in the subsequent 
tables are quite insensitive to the specific categorization we choose.  To help put this in perspective, in 
Table 3 we document how the distribution of the 120 projects across these four categories changes for 
the 1,024 different permutations outlined above across three different screens.  The first two columns 
correspond to a categorization scheme where we assumed that a project would only be viable if the 
judge allocated 100% of the funding goal to the project. The next two correspond to a screen where the 
funding threshold is 75% and finally, the last two columns correspond to a screen where the funding 
threshold is 50%.   
Within each funding screen, we first report the degree of agreement between experts and 
crowds – that is the percentage of cases where they either both fund a project or both don’t fund a 
project.  The first row reports the average agreement for a given screen across all 1,024 combinations of 
judges.  As can be seen from Columns 1, 3, and 5, there is a strong degree of agreement between 
experts and the crowds, around 59% on average, and ranging from 56.7% to 65%.   
We demonstrate the strength of this correlation in two, related ways.  First, we compare the 
extent of agreement in Table 3A to a hypothetical case where a judge funds projects at random (with a 
50% probability).  The simulations show that the percentage of agreement needs to be approximately 
55.5% or more before we can conclude that agreement is not due to a random process at the 90% 
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confidence interval and need to be 57.5% or more before we can conclude that agreement is not due to 
random process at the 95% confidence level. As can be seen from Table 3A, the minimum level of 
agreement using each screen is always greater than 55.5% and almost always greater than 57.5%.  
The second way we demonstrate the strength of the positive correlation is to run a regression 
where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if there is agreement between the experts and crowds, 
and the key explanatory variable is where the project was successful on Kickstarter. The coefficient on 
the key variable of interest can be stated as ρ= E[Yi | Ci=1] – E[Yi | Ci=0], where Yi is an indicator that 
takes the value of 1 if the judge funds the project i,  Ci =1 if the crowd funded the project and Ci =0 if the 
crowd did not fund the project.  If the judge funds a project each time the crowd does and does not fund 
the project each time the crowd does not, then E[Yi | Ci=1]=1 and E[Yi | Ci=0]=0 , leading the difference 
to be +1 (which, as one would like it to be, is perfect positive correlation).  On the other hand, if the 
expert rejects a project each time the crowd funds it and funds the project each time the crowd does 
not, then E[Yi | Ci=1]=0 and E[Yi | Ci=0]=1 , leading the difference to be -1 (which, as one would like it to 
be, is perfect negative correlation).  Further, note that if the judge funds projects at random, then E[Yi | 
Ci=1] = E[Yi | Ci=0] and hence the correlation between the crowd and expert evaluation is zero.  The 
requirement for the conditional expectations to be equal is that the projects be funded at random, 
rather than the specific probability of say 50%.  For example, a judge who used a stacked coin that 
funded every third project would still be as likely to fund a project that was funded by the crowd (1/3) as 
a project that was not funded by the crowd (still 1/3).  This is because with a random coin flip that is 
unrelated to whether the crowd did or did not fund the project, the E[Yi]is independent of Ci , leading 
E[Yi | Ci=1] = E[Yi | Ci=0].  Therefore, under the null of random funding by the judges (at any approval 
rate), we should expect the coefficient in our regression to be zero.  
We report the result from these regressions in Table 3B, where, as with Table 2, we pick the first 
judge who responded to each set in our survey.  The results from Table 3B show that there is in fact a 
strong, positive correlation between judge and crowd evaluations, rejecting the null hypothesis that this 
could be due to random at the 5% confidence interval.  Of course, as with Table 2, we can check that our 
specific combination of judges is representative of the findings reported in Table 3B.  We find that in 
every case our coefficients are significant at the 10% confidence interval, and in nearly 90% of the cases, 
they are also significant at the 5% confidence interval.  
Despite these differences in categorization of projects, it can be seen that therefore that there is 
strong agreement between judges and crowds.  Regardless of the screen used, we can almost always 
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reject the hypothesis that the agreement was purely due to chance at the 95% confidence interval, and 
always reject it at the 10% confidence interval. This confirms the broad patterns we documented in 
Tables 1 and 2.  However, Table 3A also documents that the “off diagonals” – the projects where the 
crowds and judges disagreed about the funding decision – represent about 40% of the projects and that 
these disagreements are most often comprised of projects that were rejected by experts but funded by 
the crowd.  That is, among the projects where there is a disagreement, an overwhelming share – about 
three-quarters of the projects on average– are ones where the crowd chose to fund them but the 
experts did not. 
In subsequent tables, we focus on two questions related to this heterogeneity.  First, are there 
systematic differences in the attributes of the projects that are funded by only the crowd and only the 
experts?  The second question arises from the fact that the majority of disagreements are constituted by 
projects funded by the crowd but rejected by experts.  Given that many projects were funded by the 
crowd, but not by experts, are the results of these projects systematically different than those where 
experts and the crowd agreed?  Since these projects were successfully funded on Kickstarter, we are 
able to examine real outcomes to study this issue.  These questions get to the heart of the how the 
difference in the organization of crowds from that of experts may lead to different types of projects 
being funded.   
[Table 4 about here] 
 In Table 4, we first examine whether there are systematic differences in the characteristics of 
projects that were funded only by the crowds compared to those funded only by experts.8  To do so, we 
run OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the specific characteristic we are examining, and 
the main right hand side variables are indicators for whether the project fell in one of the four mutually 
exclusive categories outlined above.  The projects that were funded by neither the crowd nor the 
experts are treated as the omitted, reference category, so all coefficients can be interpreted as 
deviations from this baseline.  The specific screen we use for these regressions is one where the funding 
threshold is 75%.  All regressions include judge fixed effects and the set of control variables used in 
Table 2.  We report robust standard errors that are clustered by judge. 
                                                          
8 From this point on, we now focus on the combination of judges that were used in the regressions in Table 2 and 
3B that have been shown to be quite typical of the 1,024 possible combinations of judges we might have used. 
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 Table 4 shows some interesting patterns.  First, projects that were not liked by either the crowds 
or judges had larger funding goals than any of the other three categories.  Projects that were funded 
had systematically lower funding goals, although a large funding goal does not account for why the 
crowd did not fund the subset of projects that the experts liked that were unsuccessful on Kickstarter. 
Columns 2-6 provide an explanation for why this may be the case.  Column 2 documents that projects 
that were ultimately funded (rows (a) and (c)) have significantly larger average funding amounts than 
those that were funded only by the experts (row (b)).  A Wald test for the difference in coefficients 
shows that these differences are also statistically significant.  That is, it seems that while the funding 
goals were not different, projects that the crowds liked had significantly larger average funding amounts 
compared to those that were not funded.  Note that average funding size is a relevant metric since 
Kickstarter collects and keeps data on all those who commit funding to projects even when the project is 
unsuccessful in meeting its goal. This is because commitments are made in a continuous manner, but 
are only “drawn upon” when the project has met its goal. Thus, we still have instances where some 
individuals have committed funding to unsuccessful projects.  In these instances, we find that the 
average funding amounts are significantly lower.  This is most easily seen by looking at Figure 2.  
The pattern seen in Figure 2 could be for two reasons.  First, those who were successful could be 
connected to a wealthier network, so that they are able to get larger commitments from their backers 
and hence more easily reach their goal.  This might be particularly true because studies of crowdfunding 
suggest that friends and family are often a critical base for campaigns (Agrawal et al., 2010)9.  The 
second explanation is that there are systematic differences in the ways in which the two groups 
approach fundraising on Kickstarter, and that the differences in commitments are an indication of the 
skill associated with raising money from crowds.10  Of course, these are not mutually exclusive 
explanations and both could be true.  The evidence presented in Table 4 is certainly consistent with 
theory that there are differences in fundraising approaches, and provides some suggestive evidence that 
networks may also be important.  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 show that projects that successfully raise 
                                                          
9 In our follow-up survey of successful projects, project creators suggested that friend and family support was 
important, but probably not the provider of the majority of funding.  In a five point Likert scale ranging from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree,” the mean answer to the question “My backers were mostly friends and 
family” was 3.7, s.d.=1.1, 
10 Note that there is also the possibility that projects that offered a higher consumption utility (say because people 
wanted to watch the play) raised higher amounts through ticket sales. As we note later, this was not the case, so 
we do not focus on this possible mechanism.   
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money from crowds provide a greater number of reward levels for the crowds and also more commonly 
post “updates” about their project within the first three days after launch. This is equally true for rows 
(a) and (c), but we can see that row (b) is significantly different.  Moreover, Columns 5 and 6 document 
that the projects that were rated highly by experts but did not raise money from crowds also did not 
provide as many pictures or videos as those that were successful.  In addition, Column 7 suggests that 
the language in the projects that were funded only by experts tended to be more formal11 than those 
funded by only the crowd, suggesting that crowds may have a disposition towards less formal language. 
Together, columns 3-7 paint a consistent picture:  raising money from the crowd seems to involve a skill 
that may be independent of the quality of the project (in much the same way as raising money from 
experts requires skill).  Those who do not pitch to the crowd in an appropriate way may not be 
successful in raising money, even if the quality of the underlying project is high12.   
Columns 8 and 9 examine the hypothesis that those who are successful in raising money from 
crowds may have better or wealthier networks.  Column 8 shows that those who were successful had 
the same network size, as proxied by the number of Facebook friends.  A difference in funding 
commitment for a similar size of network could be consistent with wealthier friends and family, 
although it could also proxy for the skill in approaching the crowd.  In Column 9, we show that those 
projects that only the crowd liked were somewhat more likely to be based in New York or California – 
this could proxy for the wealth of the local network or again, could proxy for savviness with social media 
and running crowdfunding campaigns.  Alternatively it could also be due only to the degree of diffusion 
of the Kickstarter platform in these two states. On balance, we find the strongest evidence for 
systematic differences in raising crowd funding as stemming from skill in running such campaigns, 
although we cannot rule out that this was also due to differences in networks.  Further evidence of the 
role of skill in crowdfunding stems from the fact that the attributes of projects funded by both the 
                                                          
11 Our measure of formality in this context is the share of words in the proposal that were longer than 6 letters, as 
studies have shown that longer world length in a body of text is correlated with the level of formality in that text 
(Brooke, Wang, & Hirst, 2010; Karlgren & Cutting, 1994). We also have some qualitative evidence that proposals 
that used swear words were less likely to be funded by experts, suggesting that informality may be punished.  
12 These factors of the pitch tend to be established prior to the launch of a crowdfunding campaign.  For updates, 
we follow Mollick (2014) and only measure whether projects were updated in the first three days after launch, 
reducing the risk that updates are a reaction to success.  At the same time, we cannot rule out that these factors 
could be changed in reaction to the crowd and are careful, therefore, not to push a causal explanation for these 
differences. 
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crowd and experts (row (a)) are more similar to those funded by only the crowd (row (c)) than each of 
these is to those funded only by experts (row (b)).   
Next, we consider how judges rate projects that are supported by the crowd alone compare to 
those that are not. Table 5 provides the differences in scores attributed to these projects by our experts.  
The specifications run in Table 5 are identical to those in Table 4, with the exception that the dependent 
variables are dimensions along which the experts were asked to evaluate the projects.  The high scores 
associated with rows (a) and (b) are mechanical, in that these are projects that the experts would have 
funded. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the projects that the crowd and experts funded rank higher 
than those funded only by experts, again reinforcing the notion that the projects where both crowds 
and experts agree to fund are likely to be extremely high quality.   
Looking at row (c) is also instructive since it shows that the point estimates are consistently higher 
than the omitted category, although they are often imprecisely estimated so that the differences are not 
statistically significant. That is, there is a subset of projects that the crowd funded that the experts found 
no better than the omitted category (those that neither the crowd nor experts liked).  Indeed, our 
survey of the successful Kickstarter projects suggests that this was also true to experts in general:  the 
subset that only the crowd funded raised an average of $1,900 from institutional sources prior to the 
campaign compared to $4,850 for those that the experts and crowds funded.  That is, our finding that 
experts did not rate these projects as highly seems to be broadly representative of how other experts 
may have also viewed these projects.  Nevertheless, it is interesting that the one column where there is 
a statistically significant difference between row (c) and the omitted category is around the quality of 
the project.  That is, among projects that the experts chose not to fund, those that were funded by the 
crowd were deemed to be higher quality projects by the experts than those that the crowd did not fund 
(although, of course they were also ranked as lower quality than rows (a) and (b)).  Again, this supports 
the notion that even when there is disagreement between crowds and experts on the funding decision, 
there still seems to be some level of congruence in terms of the broad sense of which projects are 
higher quality.  
In Tables 6 and 7, we turn to qualitative evidence about the longer-term outcomes of projects.  We 
relied on survey data for information on both audience size and the degree to which projects succeeded 
or failed at meeting their audience goals.  We also asked respondents to provide links or excerpts from 
reviews.  In all cases, we also attempted to locate reviews ourselves by searching for the project on 
Factiva and on Google. To be conservative, we classified projects in one of four ways:  We considered 
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projects to be failures if they received only bad reviews and did not run for their full length.13  Successes 
made up the vast majority of projects. These were projects that ran for their intended length but did not 
earn rave reviews from national publications, though they may have received good local press.  This 
category contains a wide range of projects, some much more successful than others, as indicated by the 
qualitative data in the tables.  Finally, we categorized projects as commercial hits if they had 
substantially extended runs in front of large crowds, and as critical hits if they received either rave 
reviews from national publications, or else won prestigious theater awards.   
In Table 6, we look at the long-term outcome of the projects that both crowds and experts funded.  
We have survey responses that include self-reported outcome data on 11 of the 22 such projects.  Using 
our conservative coding regime, none of these projects failed, and one turned into a commercial hit.  
Examining the more detailed qualitative data, it is apparent that there were a wide variety of critical and 
commercial outcomes, but a relative dearth of either clear failures or runaway successes. Though these 
results are tentative, most projects selected by both the crowd and experts appeared to deliver on their 
promise, with some variation in the critical and commercial acclaim achieved.   
In Table 7, we re-create this for projects that the crowd funded, but which the experts did not.    
Here we have self-reported outcome data on 17 out of the 38 productions.  Remarkably, we find quite a 
similar pattern, with the vast majority of projects achieving the same level of success as the projects 
endorsed by the experts.  To the extent that there are differences, there is one failure among the crowd-
selected projects, and four projects that we could consider hits.  Two of these hits are critical, rather 
than commercial, successes – an ironic outcome, given that these performances were rejected by the 
expert critics, but embraced by the crowd, in the funding stage.  We find that the broad picture is one 
where 94% of the funded projects supported by the crowd alone had at least moderate success, and 
24% were extremely successful, some artistically, and some commercially. This compares to a 100% 
success rate from the projects backed by both crowds and experts, of which 9% were extremely 
successful14.   
                                                          
13 One concern about crowdfunding has been that some projects may fail to deliver entirely, either because of 
malicious intent or else failure on the part of the project creators.  We found only one example of this sort of 
project, in this case due to the death of a project creator, adding to research suggesting fraud on Kickstarter is 
uncommon (Mollick, 2014) 
14 While we did not have survey results for the remaining 32 projects, we did seek to establish whether or not 
critical reviews of the projects indicated any substantial deviation from that observed in the projects for which we 
had survey results.  We did not locate any indication of a systematic difference.  Of the 11 projects that did not 
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We also endeavored to examine the outcomes of the 11 projects selected by experts but not 
funded by the crowd. We were able to determine that seven of these projects were ultimately staged. 
All seven would be considered minor successes, but none achieved high levels of critical notice, or 
substantial commercial success. 
Although we hesitate to draw broad conclusions from the limited data, we find it interesting that 
within the bucket of projects unfunded by experts, the experts do seem to give higher ratings to projects 
that were ultimately more successful.  This suggests that the screen used by the crowd is somewhat 
lower, but not entirely without merit (although the crowd also funded the only project to fail 
dramatically). These results are suggestive of a case where the crowd selects some projects with greater 
variability in potential outcome than experts, resulting in more failures, but more breakout hits, than the 
experts, similar to findings about how the structure or the number of participants in screening can 
generate more high quality and low quality ideas (Sah & Stiglitz, 1986; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009; 
Terwiesch & Xu, 2008).   
A possible alternative explanation of the ability of the crowd to pick successful projects is that the 
crowd might serve as the factor that makes these products succeed.  By pre-purchasing tickets through 
Kickstarter (one of many potential rewards offered by artists), they may be assuring the success of these 
shows.  Using our survey data, we examined the 14 projects that provided us with estimates of total 
ticket sales.  Together, these projects sold 25,779 tickets overall, of which 961 were pre-sold through 
Kickstarter, or less than 4%.  Pre-sales on Kickstarter did not seem to account for the success of these 
shows, based on this measure.  Further, pre-sales would not be predictive of critical acclaim, which also 
seemed to accrue disproportionately to projects backed by the crowd alone. 
6. Discussion 
Given the rise of crowds as a vital part of decision-making in areas ranging from product design to 
entrepreneurship, the question of how the judgment of crowds compares to that of experts is of great 
                                                          
answer the survey but which were supported by the crowd and the experts, 10 appeared to be successes, with 1 
project failing due to the death of a key member of the theater troupe. Of the 21 projects that were funded only 
by the crowd, at least 1 was a critical success, winning a prestigious theater award, while 2 others appeared to win 
less prestigious theater honors. Additionally, 2 were partial failures, having delivered some of the performances 
promised in their campaign, but not all, although both projects promised to finish delivery in 2014 or 2015, and 
still appeared to enjoy backer support. These results align with those from the survey group, suggesting that there 
does not appear to be large hidden biases in Tables 6 and 7, but that if anything, the crowd seems to be associated 
with slightly more variance in outcomes.  
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importance.  While there have been some signs that crowds could act wisely, most examples of crowd 
wisdom either include experts that ultimately exercise final judgment, as in crowdsourcing (Afuah & 
Tucci, 2012; Poetz & Schreier, 2012) or compare aggregated predictions to those of individuals (Budescu 
& Chen, 2014; Larrick & Soll, 2012; Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004).  Crowdfunding, like other emerging areas 
where crowds act without intermediaries or secondary markets, operates differently, heightening the 
risk that the crowd could be “mad” – subject to irrational exuberance, follies of group decision-making, 
or other collective pitfalls.  Further, even if crowds are not directly irrational, they could still only express 
idiosyncratic or popular tastes, ignoring proposals that would normally be supported by experts.  
The first contribution of our work is to document strong congruence in the judgment of crowds and 
experts in a highly subjective environment such as theater, even outside of prediction markets or 
forecasting competitions.  These results were robust to many kinds of measurement. Further, we see no 
signs that, for those decisions where crowds and experts diverge, that the decisions supported by the 
crowd alone perform systematically worse than those of the experts.  The projects selected by the 
crowd succeeded 93% of the time, while those selected by crowds and experts succeeded 100% of the 
time. However, among the successes, the crowds also seemed associated with bigger hits, suggesting 
more variability in the outcomes rather than a lower mean.  
Our results also shed light on the differences between crowd and expert judgment. The biggest 
differences we found between projects that the crowd alone supported versus those supported by 
experts seemed to be in the style of presentation, rather than the quality of the actual project itself. The 
more “crowdfunding friendly” a quality proposal was – taking advantage of the internet by using videos 
and pictures, including many rewards for backers, and so on – the more it seemed to appeal to the 
crowd.  Similarly, experts also seem to have signals that they look for – for example the degree of 
formality of a proposal, or the presence of swear words. Our results suggest that these differences in 
tastes can have meaningful real outcomes, in that the crowd seems willing to fund projects that experts 
are not, even when experts are given unlimited funds and similarly, the crowd seems to systematically 
miss projects that experts like because they are not pitched in a “crowdfunding friendly” format. 
In this sense, our paper provides evidence of the important role crowdfunding can have in 
democratizing entry among projects that experts might have rejected.  For example, crowdfunding 
provides the possibility of funding to individuals who would not otherwise have access to funds because 
of the potential challenges of applying for NEA grants: they may not have experience or knowledge of 
grant writing, may have the wrong skillset to apply, or may be proposing programs that are not within 
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NEA guidelines. 15  Based on this evidence, the change from a hierarchical expert-led system to a mixed 
expert and crowd-based one may have large positive effects on the types of innovations that the system 
produces (Sah & Stiglitz, 1986), as allowing more ideas to come to fruition has been shown to lead to 
increased innovation quality (Kornish & Ulrich, 2011; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009). Similarly, a more diverse 
pool of individual innovators can further increase innovation (Østergaard, Timmermans, & Kristinsson, 
2011).   
It is important to note that, while we find encouraging evidence for the value of crowd decision-
making, this does not devalue the role of experts.  For example, some discussions with experts showed 
more willingness to fund more artistically challenging work that may not appeal to the crowd.  Experts 
may also be less swayed by the salesmanship of the pitch, as evidenced by the lower importance they 
appeared to place on the multimedia in the pitch itself.  Our results are consistent with, and indeed 
support, the notion that in a crowd-based decision regime there is still a critical place for expert judges. 
In fact, we aim to stress that our setting and research design does not allow us to speak definitively to 
the important and pertinent policy question of what would happen to theater projects if we shifted 
from a purely expert-funded model to a purely crowd-funded one.  This is because we are focused on 
projects that applied to a crowd funding site rather than the universe of artistic projects that might be 
available16.  For example, some have argued that the growing importance of Kickstarter in the funding of 
the arts reduces the need for the government to provide funding to such endeavors through the NEA, 
which has an annual operating budget of about $150 million.  Although our results suggest that 
crowdfunding can play an important role to complement such organizations, we are less well-positioned 
to speak to questions related to how a decrease in theater grants from the NEA would impact the nature 
                                                          
15 As noted above, there are some suggestions in the data that the crowd may be more willing to take a chance on 
projects with higher variance outcomes than experts might be comfortable with.  Though it is not statistically 
testable, we find that the crowd funded a higher percentage of hits (27%) than the experts (7%), and also the only 
project that failed due to a quality issue.  Increasing the number of high variance projects may lead to more 
breakthrough ideas. 
16 Consider the following example:  Say of 10 projects p1- p10, the crowd would fund p1-p3, neither crowds nor 
experts would fund p4 and experts would fund p5-p10. If a study sample contained only projects p1- p6, say 
because p7-p10  were not conducive to being listed on a crowdfunding site, then showing that a majority p1-p6 
were funded by the crowd does not tell us anything about whether the crowd-only or expert-only system is better. 
In this example, if one were to choose between a crowd-funded or expert-funded system, the expert-based one 
would fund six projects compared to only three under a purely crowd-funded system even though the sample in 
question had a lower share of projects funded by experts. This is why one would need the universe of projects, 
together with project fixed effects to effectively address this policy question.  We thank a referee for clarifying this 
issue.   
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and style of theater productions in the United States, especially theater produced by underrepresented 
groups, or works that are artistically challenging.   
 Although our analysis was conducted for theater projects, we feel that our key result, that 
experts demonstrate a strong congruence with projects funded by the crowd, is likely to generalize to 
other settings where the crowd is an end user for the product being financed and hence might be well 
positioned to judge the project. While this is likely to be true for many aspects of the arts, such as film, 
music and dance, we believe that there are also aspects of technological innovation where crowds can 
play a key role in complementing experts as sources of capital.  Kickstarter has proven to be an 
influential source for innovations in areas as gaming and consumer-facing internet technologies, as well 
as more specialized areas such as wearable computing and 3D printing.  Indeed, a number of startups 
that have raised funding on Kickstarter have gone on to raise institutional venture capital suggesting the 
growing role that the crowd can play in providing validation of “traction” for experts.17 
Our research has some limitations and strengths.  One limitation is our study stems from the 
research design: we chose to restrict our analysis to a set of projects where, ex ante, we believed there 
to be overlap in the types of projects that were funded by the crowd and the types of projects our 
experts would evaluate in other settings, such as when reviewing for the NEA or foundations.  We thus 
restricted our study to theater projects seeking at least $10,000.  While we believe that theater offers a 
conservative test of crowd wisdom, given its subjective nature and the divide between critics and 
customers, we cannot necessarily generalize these findings to all other forms of crowd judgment.  
Furthermore, our results speak to crowd funding behavior conditional on the funding size we studied.  If 
projects seeking much smaller funding, even within theater, are more frivolous or associated with 
different crowdfunding motivations, our findings will not apply to them. Second, while our outcome 
data is strongly suggestive of similar outcomes between the crowd only and the expert and crowd 
backed projects, it is circumstantial in nature, and hard to measure directly.  Third, we focus only on 
projects that applied for crowdfunding, rather than the universe of all theater projects, which implies 
that we are limited in our ability to speak to which screening regime (crowds vs. experts) is better suited 
                                                          
17 For example, Kerr, Nanda, and Rhodes-Kropf (2014) document the difficulty that even professional investors 
have in predicting which investments are likely to be successful.  Indeed, there seems to be a growing move among 
early stage investors to demonstrate ‘traction’ with customers, as is demonstrated by platforms such as AngelList 
profiling these metrics for potential investors.  
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to the projects applying for funding or to address the question of how a shift from one funding regime 
to another might impact which projects are commercialized.   
Despite these limitations, however, our approach also has strengths. A key strength is that by using 
panels of expert judges to evaluate existing projects, we were able to avoid many of the endogenity 
concerns that might otherwise arise in such studies.  Further, the opinions of judges on projects are 
robust to judge fixed effects, suggesting that our results are not purely the result of idiosyncratic views 
of some judges.  Additionally, we were able to use field data representing actual crowd decisions from 
the largest crowdfunding platform, observing both successful and failed projects.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Our study offers the first detailed comparison of crowd and expert judgment, an issue of increasing 
relevance in a world where crowdfunding, crowdsourcing, crowdscience, and related concepts are 
increasing in popularity, and where billions of dollars are being deployed through crowdfunding 
platforms. In particular, we can effectively address the extent to which experts agree or disagree with 
the funding decisions of the crowd, and thereby use this as a benchmark for the wisdom of crowds.  We 
find that the crowd is more wise than mad, generally agreeing with the experts, and that, on average, 
the projects selected by the crowd alone seem to do as well as those selected by experts. For academics, 
our work highlights the need to better understand the ways in which crowd decisions are made and the 
circumstances under which the crowd, experts, or a combination should be deployed to address 
particular needs.  Practically, this paper suggests that crowdfunding may be a viable source of 
entrepreneurial financing, for both cultural projects and traditional startups.  The crowd has the 
potential to increase innovation, lower barriers to entry, and democratize the entrepreneurial process 
by allowing more ideas to compete in the marketplace, particularly as a complement to expert 
judgment. 
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Figure 1: Example of a Project 
This example project was funded by the crowd, but not by judges. It was a commercial success, with 48 shows at a 300 seat 
theater that were 2/3 to completely full and tickets priced at $24-$44.   It also received positive local reviews, including the Best 
Local Musical and four other awards by BroadwayWorld, as well as generally positive reviews from local papers, such as the San 
Francisco Examiner: "This is their first original production and is definitely worth it. I had such a good time that I will likely be 
going back." 
 
  
Project goal and amount 
raised. Project creators do 
not get any money until 
the goal is reached. 
Video and description of 
the proposed project. 
Number of people backing 
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Rewards offered in return 
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Tickets for the project itself 
were not available until the 
$100 reward level. 
Project creator 
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Figure 2:  Kernel Density plots of average scores assigned to projects by experts 
 
Figure 3:  Kernel Density plots of average funding amounts 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics on Projects 
 
          
  All 
Reached or 
exceeded 
funding goal 
on 
Kickstarter 
Did not 
reach 
funding goal 
on 
Kickstarter 
T-test for 
difference 
Number of projects 120 60 60  
Number of evaluations from judges 180 90 90  
     
Probability judge was familiar with project 6.1% 7.7% 4.4% 0.35 
Average Score 3.0 3.1 2.8 0.01 *** 
Average Novelty 2.8 3.0 2.6 0.02 ** 
Average Relevance 2.7 2.9 2.6 0.04 ** 
Average Quality 3.0 3.2 2.7 < 0.01 *** 
Average Feasibility 3.4 3.6 3.2 < 0.01 *** 
Average Reach 2.8 2.9 2.7 0.09 * 
Probability ranked as "Best" among set of 
projects evaluated 17% 22% 11% 0.05** 
Probability ranked as "Worst" among set of 
projects evaluated 17% 9% 24% < 0.01 *** 
Average funding share proposed by judges 44% 52% 35% < 0.01 *** 
          
Notes:  This table reports descriptive statistics on the sample of 120 Kickstarter projects that were grouped into 20 sets of 6 
projects each.  Each set comprised 3 successful and 3 unsuccessful projects that were then randomly assigned to experts who 
regularly review applications for the theatre arm of institutions such as the National Endowment for the Arts. The specific 
questions each judge was asked to answer about each project are reported in the Appendix.  Each set of 6 projects was 
evaluated by at least one judge and half the sets were evaluated by 2 judges.  Inter-rater reliability for these judges was 0.45.  
This table reports descriptive statistics on the expert evaluations of the projects, broken down by whether the project 
successfully raised funding on the Kickstarter platform.   
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Table 2 
Correlation between judge evaluations and Kickstarter success 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Average Score from judges   
Funding share proposed by 
judges 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Reached or Exceeded goal on  0.564*** 0.559*** 0.551***  0.212*** 0.211*** 0.209*** 
Kickstarter (0.171) (0.177) (0.189)  (0.062) (0.064) (0.068) 
 
Constant 2.597*** 2.422*** 2.584***  0.308*** 0.220*** 0.306*** 
 (0.106) (0.184) (0.092)  (0.053) (0.071) (0.032) 
        
Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Judge fixed effects No No Yes  No No Yes 
Number of observations 120 120 120  120 120 120 
R-squared 0.12 0.15 0.34   0.12 0.19 0.33 
 
Notes:  This table reports the results of OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is either the 
average score that the judge assigned a project or the share of funding goal that the judge proposed the 
project should get.  Specifications (2), (3), (5) and (6) control for the background of the judges, including 
the number of times they have evaluated grant applications for theatre projects, their affiliation with 
the theatre industry, their familiarity with specific projects and the time they took to complete the 
survey.  Columns (3) and (6) further add individual fixed effects for each judge.  The key coefficients of 
interest are related to indicator variables for whether the project either reached or exceeded its goal on 
Kickstarter.  These coefficients are estimated relative to the category of projects that did not reach their 
goal on Kickstarter. We report robust standard errors that are clustered by judge. *, ** and *** refer to 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3a 
Level of Agreement between Crowds and Experts 
 
 
 
Notes:  This table reports the degree to which experts and crowds agree on which projects to fund, and the extent to which the disagreement is 
driven by projects funded by the crowd and not experts versus those funded by experts but not the crowd.  We create three funding thresholds 
for experts (100%, 75% and 50%) so that a project is deemed funded by an expert only if they allocated more than that threshold for the given 
project.  We then look at all 1,024 possible combinations of judges and for each combination, calculate the extent to which the experts would 
have agreed with the crowd's funding decision, given the different funding thresholds.  Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the degree of agreement 
between experts and crowds and different percentiles of the distribution across the 1,024 combination of judges.  For example, the average 
degree of agreement at the 75% funding threshold was 58.8%.  Columns (2), (4) and (6) further report the extent to which the disagreement is 
driven by crowds funding the projects the experts would have rejected or vice-versa.  They show that most of the disagreement is comprised of 
projects funded by the crowd but rejected by the experts. For example, 76% of the projects where experts and crowds did not agree at the 75% 
funding threshold were ones where the crowd funded the project but experts did not.  Hence, only 24% of the disagreements in this example 
were due to projects funded by experts but rejected by the crowd.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of cases where 
Experts and Crowd 
agree on funding 
outcome
Share of 
disagreement cases 
where crowd funds 
but experts do not
Share of cases where 
Experts and Crowd 
agree on funding 
outcome
Share of 
disagreement cases 
where crowd funds 
but experts do not
Share of cases 
where Experts and 
Crowd agree on 
funding outcome
Share of 
disagreement cases 
where crowd funds 
but experts do not
Mean 58.8% 80% 58.8% 76% 62.1% 57%
Minimum 56.7% 71% 56.7% 68% 59.2% 44%
25th percentile 57.9% 78% 57.9% 74% 60.8% 52%
Median 58.8% 80% 58.8% 76% 62.1% 57%
75th percentile 59.6% 82% 59.6% 78% 63.3% 58%
Maximum 60.8% 89% 60.8% 84% 65.0% 68%
Funding threshold is 100% of goal Funding threshold is 75% of goal Funding threshold is 50% of goal
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Table 3b 
Level of Agreement between Crowds and Experts 
 
 
Notes:  This table reports the results of OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
crowds and experts agree on the funding decision.  Columns 1-2 run specifications where the expert is deemed to have funded the project when 
the funding threshold is 100%, columns 3-4 refer to the funding threshold of 75% and columns 5-6 refer to the funding threshold of 50%. The key 
coefficient of interest is an indicator variables for whether the project either reached or exceeded its goal on Kickstarter.  These coefficients are 
estimated relative to the category of projects that did not reach their goal on Kickstarter. We report robust standard errors that are clustered by 
judge. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reached or Exceeded goal on Kickstarter 0.167** 0.167** 0.183** 0.183** 0.250*** 0.250**
(0.073) (0.077) (0.073) (0.077) (0.083) (0.087)
Constant 0.108 0.167*** 0.138 0.183*** 0.218* 0.317***
(0.077) (0.039) (0.095) (0.039) (0.110) (0.044)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
R-squared 0.1 0.19 0.13 0.29 0.12 0.27
Funding threshold is 50% of goal
Funding threshold is 75% of 
goal
Funding threshold is 100% of 
goal
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Table 4 
Differences in the characteristics of projects funded by judges and crowds 
 
 
 
Notes:  This table reports the results of OLS regressions, where the dependent variables refer to a number of characteristics of the projects.   Each of the 120 
projects is divided into one of four categories (1) those that were funded by the crowd and were deemed good enough to receive at least 75% of their funding 
goal by experts (2) those that were given at least 75% of their funding goal by experts but not funded by the crowd (c) those that the crowd funded but were 
not highly funded by experts and (d) those that did not reach their goal either from the crowd or experts.  The first three coefficients are estimated relative to 
the fourth category.  We report robust standard errors that are clustered by judge and *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Log of goal
Average 
investment size
Reward levels
Number of 
updates
Number of 
pictures
Number of 
videos
Formal 
Language
Log number of 
Facebook 
friends
Located in NY 
or CA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(a)  Funded by both -0.185 24.911* 1.358 5.003*** -0.002 -0.032 -0.654 0.735 -0.103
(0.148) (13.649) (1.116) (1.853) (0.101) (0.078) (1.133) (0.874) (0.126)
(b)  Only experts -0.410* -12.623 -1.096* -0.588 -0.184*** -0.122** 2.636 -0.047 -0.148
(0.220) (13.870) (0.573) (0.780) (0.056) (0.048) (1.737) (1.096) (0.167)
(c)  Only crowd -0.239** 49.755*** 1.738** 3.065*** 0.053 0.062 -0.330 0.399 0.148
(0.120) (12.898) (0.860) (1.002) (0.090) (0.080) (0.992) (0.682) (0.090)
Constant 9.866*** 84.747*** 8.551*** 2.224*** 0.184*** 0.122** 25.284*** 2.394*** 0.694***
(0.089) (7.900) (0.487) (0.574) (0.056) (0.048) (0.657) (0.444) (0.067)
p value for the difference between (b) and (c) 0.42 <0.01*** 0.06* <0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 0.09* 0.76 0.14
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
R-squared 0.057 0.146 0.053 0.189 0.060 0.029 0.007 0.007 0.065
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Table 5 
Evaluation of projects funded by judges and crowds 
 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Combined average score Novelty Relevance Quality Feasibility Commercial viability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Funded by both 1.557*** 1.587*** 1.729*** 1.864*** 1.350*** 1.252*** 
 (0.202) (0.278) (0.263) (0.301) (0.189) (0.260) 
Only experts 1.024*** 1.005*** 0.964*** 1.342*** 0.751*** 1.052*** 
 (0.187) (0.284) (0.295) (0.225) (0.249) (0.235) 
Only crowd 0.309 0.266 0.306 0.436* 0.216 0.312 
 (0.209) (0.220) (0.248) (0.225) (0.246) (0.270) 
Constant 2.271*** 1.369*** 1.777*** 2.155*** 3.481*** 2.576*** 
 (0.089) (0.100) (0.103) (0.112) (0.102) (0.115) 
       
Number of observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.58 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.47 0.41 
 
Notes:  This table reports the results of OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is either the average score that the judge assigned a project along a 
range of different dimensions.  All specifications include individual judge fixed effects and controls outlined in Table 2.   Each of the 120 projects is divided into 
one of four categories (1) those that were funded by the crowd and were deemed good enough to receive at least 75% of their funding goal by experts (2) 
those that were given at least 75% of their funding goal by experts but not funded by the crowd (c) those that the crowd funded but were not highly funded by 
experts and (d) those that did not reach their goal either from the crowd or experts.  The first three coefficients are estimated relative to the fourth category.  
We report robust standard errors that are clustered by judge and *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6 
Outcome of projects Funded by Experts and Crowds 
Classification Project Type Ranked best among 6 
projects by (most 
favorable) judge? 
Commercial outcome Critical outcome 
Success Bringing play to festival Yes Several small sold out shows at the festival. Two offers for tours 
afterward 
Mixed reviews in national 
press.  
Success Extending run of one 
woman play 
Yes Sold out 10 shows at 60 seats each show Mixed reviews in national 
press. 
Success Launching a pop-up 
theater company with an 
original play 
Yes Launched a new theater company with a new play with over 
90% of the seats filled. Sold 314 tickets, made a profit of over 
$4,000. 
Positive local press. 
Success Play featuring shelter 
dogs 
Yes Ran for one month. Broke even. Covered but not reviewed 
by national and local 
press. 
Success Original musical No Ran for one month, sold 600 seats, with a profit of about 
$15,000, "significantly below expectations" 
Positively covered in local 
press, no review. 
Success Original play No Ran for one month, 2,660 tickets sold, profit of $45,000 Positive reviews in local 
press.  
Success Revival of Tony award-
winning play 
No 3 week run in New York. 12 shows in a 50 seat theater. The last 
three were sold out, the shows prior were about half to two 
thirds full. 
No official coverage in 
publications 
Success Interpretation of Hamlet No Toured for one year through various theaters Mixed reviews in national 
press. 
Success Original musical No 7 sold out performances in 100 person theater. Broke even. Negative to mixed 
reviews in national press. 
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Success Original musical No Ran for two days, sold 300 tickets, profit of $1,500 No reviews, though the 
play was mentioned in 
national press. 
Commercial 
Hit 
Original musical with 
social message 
Yes Ongoing profitable performances, touring continuously. 
Secured underwriting after campaign.   Makes $200,000K per 
year in net revenue and $100,000 K in underwriting and is self-
supporting 
No reviews, though 
coverage in many national 
publications. 
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Table 7 
Outcome of projects rejected by experts but funded by crowds 
Classification Project Type Ranked worst 
among by (most 
favorable) judge? 
Commercial outcome Critical outcome 
Failure Brecht play No Ran for 4 days in New York, run cut short. Negative local reviews. 
Success Original 
comedy 
show 
No Two shows in New York with a total of 130 people.  They were hoping 
to raise additional funding, but failed. 
No official coverage in publications 
Success Original 
musical for 
children 
Yes Show ran for two weeks in New York, with 2,000 audience members. 
Licensed productions currently running in four states 
No official coverage in publications 
Success Production 
of Macbeth 
Yes Show ran in local market, 250 people attended No official coverage in publications 
Success Original play Yes Four performances at fringe festival. $1,000 in ticket sales Covered in local news, no review. 
Success Concert 
staging of a 
Broadway 
play 
No Show ran for three performances at capacity, 600 audience members No official coverage in publications 
Success Musical on a 
boat 
No 10 performances in New York. Raising funding for additional 
performances 
No official coverage in publications 
Success Original play No 5 performances in New York. 60% full on average (75 seats per 
performance) 
No official coverage in publications 
Success Original play No 1 month run. $17,055.64 gross revenue in ticket sales, merchandise and 
concessions. Hoped to create a touring show, but still working on 
funding. 
Mixed reviews in local press. 
Success Staging of 
Tennessee 
Williams Play 
No Ran for two weeks in local market, 250 audience members Positive local reviews. 
Success Original play No Show ran for one month Off-Off Broadway in New York. Made $24,000 
in revenue. 
Positive local reviews. 
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Success Original play No Toured various theaters. 1200- 1500 audience members total. Broke 
even. Additional tours planned. 
Positive local reviews. 
Success Original anti-
bullying play 
for children 
No Continual performances in New York, over 12,000 children total in 
audience 
No official coverage in publications 
Artistic Hit Original play No Show ran for two weeks Off-Off Broadway in New York. Made $2,500 in 
ticket sales 
Was nominated for two New York Innovative Theatre 
Awards and won one. Positive local reviews. 
Artistic Hit Original play No 1 month in New York, nearly sold out. $20,000 in ticket sales. Play being 
published as a book 
Extremely positive local and national reviews. Reviews 
were most positive of any play in the study. 
Commercial 
Hit 
Original 
musical 
No 5 sold out performances in New York, audience of 1,100. Gained an off-
Broadway run for over 2 months. 
Mixed to positive reviews in local and national press. 
Commercial 
Hit 
Original 
musical 
No Ran for 4 months. 300 seat theatre; four show a week; 12 weeks; 
general 2/3 full to full houses 
Winner of Best Local Musical and four other awards. 
Generally positive reviews.  
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Appendix : Survey Procedure and Questions 
Judges were contacted from among the list of experts who had previously acted as judges for major theater 
competitions and grants (the National Endowment for the Arts, Drama Desk Awards, New York Drama Critics' 
Circle, Pulitzer Prize for Drama, Theatre World Award, and Tony Awards).  
Judges were electronically asked to score six projects using the criteria below. All questions asked on a 1-5 point 
Likert scale, with 1 being "strongly disagree" and 5 being "strongly agree" 
Novelty 
This project displays a high degree of artistic ingenuity 
Assuming it was completed as planned, this project would advance the art form 
This project is original 
 
Quality 
The proposal for the project is of high quality 
The video added to the proposal in a meaningful way 
The artistic vision of the proposal is clear 
 
Feasibility/Realism 
The artistic and/or commercial goals of this project are achievable 
The individual or group proposing this project are qualified to complete the project 
This project can be implemented with the resources in the proposal 
 
Stakeholders and Reach 
This project would reach a diverse audience 
This project would attract a wide range of potential funders and stakeholders 
This project would be commercially viable/profitable 
 
Relevance 
Assuming it was completed as planned, this project would advance a cultural, political, or artistic dialogue 
This project promotes a high sense of audience engagement 
I feel personally excited about this project 
 
